

ARNG AH-64D

Mississippi National Guard Assessment

Contents

Format is based on Questions/Rumors of National Guard performance metrics generated by the Army Chief of Staff

- Current Readiness of Equipment
- Current Readiness of Unit (MOSQ)
- Experience of Unit
- Unit performance (Awards, Units Supported)
- Collective Training
- Impacts of Removing the AH-64D from the Guard

Readiness Rates/Deployments

Rumor: Guard Cannot Maintain the Equipment

- Data for the metrics were captured during the transition from AH-64A, AH-64D Block I, and AH-64D Block II.
 - Transient aircraft, those airframes in route to Mesa, AZ (Boeing Plant) for upgrade to AH-64D Block II came from other units being fielded new Aircraft
 - These Aircraft were temporarily held at Support Facilities and were counted against the units overall OR rates.
 - **Meaning:**
 - AH-64A aircraft awaiting induction to Mesa suffered from parts shortages or low priority due to the legacy status.
 - Transient aircraft which were not under the long term care of the unit introduced error into the data (aircraft arriving with deficiencies requiring maintenance, aircraft arriving with phase requirements which interrupted the phase flow of the unit).
 - Deployments: Guard answered all calls to deploy. Guard units were not in a deployable status during its transition and fielding of New Equipment which ran in parallel with OIF/OEF.
- Therefore a product of the Army (Aircraft fielding, transient flow) was used against the Guard since it rendered it non-deployable and susceptible to scrutiny based on its OR rates.
- **Message:** The Army presents its argument based on **flawed** data and observations.


Current OR rate of the MSARNG

- Company sized element (8 x AH-64D Bk I and II) manning 13 AH-64D, a combination of its current fielding of Block II aircraft in addition to aircraft awaiting induction to Mesa, AZ
- **Solution:** Use data based on the current and final fielding, not convoluted data captured during a transition phase or the cascading aircraft awaiting induction. The current method introduces too much error and negates all discussion

AIRCRAFT STATUS REPORT					
AASF # 2				TUPELO, MS	19-Aug-2015
(UNIT)	TAIL #	MDS	STATUS	MAINTENANCE FAULTS	REMARKS/GET WELL DATE
(A 149) 9705038		AH-64D1	FMC		W90BHE52049503
(A 149) 9705040		AH-64D1	FMC		
(A 149) 0005209		AH-64D1	FMC		
(A 149) 0005215		AH-64D1	FMC		NDI
(A 149) 0005227		AH-64D1	FMC		W90BHE52049502
(A 149) 1105691		AH-64D2	FMC	30MM	NDI
(A 149) 1105694		AH-64D2	FMC		
(A 149) 1105697		AH-64D2	FMC		
(A 149) 1105700		AH-64D2	NMCM	250 HR INSP/ENG/VERT STAB - TASMG	28-Aug-15
(A 149) 1105703		AH-64D2	FMC	50 HR INSP	
(A 149) 1105706		AH-64D2	FMC		250 HR INSP @ TASMG 28-AUG-2015
(A 149) 1105709		AH-64D2	FMC		
(A 149) 1105712		AH-64D2	FMC		

Readiness of Unit

- The Guard structure allows the capability to multi-track Warrant Officers (WO) career paths and retain that experience within the unit
- Many WO/CO possess other airframe qualifications which equates to a diverse background not anchored to a single platform and brings in a wealth of knowledge into the unit
 - Ex: OH-58D, UH-60, UH-72, C-12
- Constant and stable aviator base allows for more training, increased capability, flexibility, agility
- This construct allows the unit to be nearly 100% PIC (Pilot in Command) at any given time.
- The chart to the right is the current MOSQ by having the WO cross train and gain secondary tracks



Experience of the Unit

A technical and demanding airframe which the Guard cannot maintain

- The Guard is unique in that it can preserve precious experience and skill at the line level, unlike the Active duty which has a constant revolving introduction of new pilots as rank moves them “up and out” of the line.
- The active duty Aviation CW2 has a median of 6 years before promotion. This is a limiting factor for the knowledge and skill retained at the company level (the tactical level). (*source*: Congressional Budget Office: The Warrant Officer Ranks Feb 2002)

Question

- Where does the Active Army expect to retain its knowledge base?
 - Currently the Guard offers an alternate to retiring for separating service members which allows them to continue their flying career (preserving the skill and knowledge) and National investment
 - Under the aircraft realignment there is no retention possible within the system. The investment and skills are lost forever and with down select and promotion only a small finite set of Warrant Officers will be available within the Active Duty model to reach pinnacle proficiency levels
 - Therefore the Army model will have a limited knowledge base that will never be able to grow past a junior aviator experience level (The service member will either separate or be promoted up and out). Since there are a finite number of higher ranking positions, this will greatly diminishes the Active AH-64D experience base. The Guard does not have this problem.

Flight Hours (Skill and Experience)

- Current Aviator Experience of MSARNG (AH-64D) community
- Note that in an ARNG Aviation Unit, flying positions at the Company Level may be filled up to and including CW4. The amount of experience and skill residing at the Company Level is unprecedented for any Active Unit.
- ARNG Warrant Officers will remain within the unit for the large majority of their careers and continue to improve their skills and capability
- Higher retention rates and overall return on investment (more year of flying)
- Higher levels of proficiency are possible in ARNG flying units compared to units where a line pilot has limited career exposure


MSARNG AH-64 Pilot Experience

Abbott	1,985	484	2,117
Baker	332	273	807
Bland	402	0	482
Bryan	1,718	502	6,040
Caldwell	1,741	372	3,805
Gooch	208	0	290
Green	166	0	232
Haynie	1,230	746	2,042
Jones	331	168	464
Kilcullen	172	0	254
McCann	293	0	451
McIntosh	166	0	239
Patton	364	1,096	2,389
Pyron	209	0	293
Stegall	245	547	1,557
Stevens	0	741	4,399
Sylvien	303	0	951
Waltress	1,383	715	3,803
Weeks	2,344	1,976	6,010
Welch	1,624	632	1,887
Withrow	278	0	357
Zemek	419	0	487
Average	723	375	1,789

Apache Hours, Combat Hours, Total Hours

Flight Hours (Skill and Experience)


MSARNG AH-64 Pilot Experience



Apache Hrs, Combat Hrs and Total Hrs for each Name. Color shows details about Apache Hrs, Combat Hrs and Total Hrs. Details are shown for Name.

Hour Breakdown





Awards (OIF 06-08)


- 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses for Heroism
- 2 Soldier's Medals for Heroism
- 11 Bronze Stars
- 14 Air Medals for Valor
- 12 Air Medals for Achievement
- 30 Army Commendations Medals
- 28 Combat Action Badges
- Valorous Unit Award
- Combat Action Streamer
- 2 Campaign Streamers
 - Iraqi Campaign
 - Global War on Terror
- British SAS Award
- 101st Airborne (SSI-FWS)
- SOCOM (SSI-FWS)



Do Lesser Missions Warrant this level of Recognition?



Signed: LTG Odierno



Collective and Continual Training

- The MS Guard continues to collectively train with a wide array of service components
 - 155th ABCT (MSARNG) collective tasks supporting the conventional fight - BDE level operations
 - Emerald Warrior (2014) supporting SOCOM, to include international partners (Canadian SOF, Israel, British SAS)
 - Special Boat Team-22 (SOCOM) Stennis, MS – providing Close Combat Attack (CCA), ISR capabilities and integration
 - 238th ASOS – JTAC proficiency
 - Mobilization/Rotating units through (Camp Shelby, MS)
 - UAS (Manned/Unmanned Integration)
 - Providing a test bed for AMCOM (Restone Arsenal) for evaluation and training

Impacts on the Guard

- Loss of the AH-64D will be the end of Combat Aviation in the Guard
- The 2nd and 3rd order effects:
 - CABs will cease to exist in the Guard
 - AVN Structure of the Guard will differ from its Active Component (no longer modular and cannot be swapped, exchanged, or integrated)
 - Will require a balancing of the force throughout the 50 States. The Blackhawks (UH-60) being promised are outdated legacy aircraft.
 - Mississippi already has a dense lift capability, with a redistribution of Aircraft it is likely MS will not receive any compensation as a result of this realignment (this is now fact)
 - No Guard divisions will resemble the Active Component

Precedence

- The aviation realignment is the result of a theme that Governors want Blackhawk in lieu of Apaches for domestic missions
- Domestic missions are an additional responsibility of the Guard, not the primary (which is a combat ready force to protect the US)
- If this message remains then all combat units within the Guard are at risk (why does a Governor want BCTs?), let us exchange their tanks for HMMWVs and MP units. The simple movement of 8 AH-64D BNs could be the beginning of the end for combat forces in the Guard (less than strategic...basically a defunct force with no responsibilities or capability).

Cost and Budget

- Why place the AH-64D in the Active Component from where it currently resides?
 - Loss of skill from seasoned aviators and maintainers
 - Currently a third of the cost
 - Air Force study recently released demonstrated that the Guard/Reserve is the only viable way to protect force structure at a reduced budget
 - This isn't the answer the Active components wants to hear but it's the reality of money verses machine. Their major cost is Pay and Allowances, until they can reduce that burden they are not addressing the real issue.
- Replacement of the OH-58D with a more costly airframe
 - No studies have proven that its capable of the role
 - Viewed as an artificial gap (retire the OH-58D to create the need to drive the transition of the AH-64D to the Active Component)
- Why wait until the all the Guard AH-64s were transformed to the AH-64D (using money obligated to the Guard) before attempting to transfer the assets?

185th Theater Aviation Brigade and 1108th TASMKG

- Both are currently Deployed to Kuwait
- 185th is filling the role of a Combat Aviation Brigade
- Was able to pull AH64 and OH58D experience to fill those additional roles that a CAB has.
- Because of this AH64 and OH58D experience within the state, the Army basically gets an extra CAB entity for the cost of a TAB.
- The 1108th TASMKG was also able to pull AH64 and OH58D experience from within the state to help support their operations on their current deployment.

Unbiased Assessment

- Perform a collective study on the Guard and Active AH-64D and its impact on cost (if it is a budget argument then allow an independent assessment)
- Perform simultaneously an impact study of the loss of the OH-58D on the Active Duty and Guard (is this a cost effective decision, is the risk worth the decision)
 - True cost and burden: retraining the Guard aviators, retraining the OH-58D units Army wide to include maintainers.
 - This decision has been made with minimal examination and study. The repercussion of a poorly scripted decision would be devastating to National Defense if this proves to be incorrect COA
 - Aviators are lost, and the capability to recoup and correct are lost
 - This decision appears illogical except by the personnel proposing this change when all other measure point to a great Guard/Reserve force in order to meet budgetary constraints
- Perform a Study on the aviator cost saving by using Guard units compared to Active units while maintaining proficiency and readiness
- Recommend the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to reduce the possibility of biasness into the recommendations
 - Do not recommend RAND
 - Do not recommend OSD/CAPES